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Shaul Tor
Mortal and Divine in Xenophanes’ 
Epistemology*       ¹
Abstract: In the first instance, this paper offers a new interpretation of the logic 
of Xenophanes B18.1. Contrary to the two ways in which previous commentators 
have construed this line, Xenophanes neither categorically rejects the notion 
of divine disclosure nor acquiesces in traditional understandings of it. Rather, 
Xenophanes rejects traditional conceptions of divine disclosure as theologi-
cally faulty and supplants them with his own, alternative notion of disclosure. 
Having argued that Xenophanes developed a conception of divine disclosure, I 
advance further suggestions concerning its function and characteristics. I follow 
and develop Lesher’s (1983) argument that Xenophanes arrives at his under-
standing of the limitations of human knowledge by rejecting traditional divina-
tory assumptions. But Lesher, I suggest, tells only half the story. On Xenophanes’ 
conception of disclosure, the divine purposively facilitates mortal belief-forma-
tion and mortal inquiry. That is, Xenophanes’ own understanding of disclosure 
underlies his positive views regarding what does lie within the scope of mortal 
epistemology. More speculatively, I develop two alternative interpretations of 
the precise notion of purposiveness which underlies Xenophanean disclosure. 
Most probably, Xenophanes reconceptualises the notion of divine disclosure radi-
cally as the view that the divine purposively facilitates all mortal experience and 
belief-formation as part of its intelligent direction of the cosmos and its inhabit-
ants. Another, somewhat less likely possibility is that Xenophanes maintains less 
idiosyncratically that the divine guides particular mortals in particular circum-
stances. Finally, I ask how the proposed interpretation of Xenophanes’ episte-
mology may lend nuance to our understanding of the complexity of his critical 
engagement with the traditional mantic model of divine disclosure.
Keywords: Xenophanes B18, epistemology, divine disclosure, divination, philos-
ophy and religion
Shaul Tor: Department of Classics / Department of Philosophy, King’s College, London, Strand, 
WC2R 2LS, England, E-mail: shaul.tor@kcl.ac.uk
* I am very grateful for the helpful comments which I received from the audience at the sympo-
sium. I am especially indebted to all those who kindly read and commented on earlier drafts of 
this paper: Malcolm Schofield, Robert Wardy, David Sedley, Gábor Betegh, James Warren, Geof-
frey Lloyd, Catherine Rowett, James Lesher, Patricia Curd, Harvey Lederman and István Bodnár.
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In any attempt to reflect on the relation between philosophy and religion in early 
Greek thought, and to assess the viability and implications of ‘philosophy’ and 
‘religion’ as hermeneutic categories for that period, Xenophanes’ famous and 
famously controversial B18 will prove pivotal: 
οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.
Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals,
but as they search in time they discover better.¹
In the first instance, what follows offers a new interpretation of the logic of 
B18.1. We may distinguish two ways in which the statement has been construed. 
According to the first, majority reading, (i) Xenophanes denies that the gods ever 
ὑπέδειξαν anything to mortals and (ii) this denial is tantamount to a categori-
cal rejection of divine disclosure. (ii) is affirmed both by the other proponents of 
the majority reading, who do not pause on the prefix ὑπό (rendering ὑπέδειξαν 
simply as ‘revealed’ or ‘disclosed’), and by Lesher, who does pause on it (ren-
dering ‘intimated’).² On the second, minority reading, again treating ὑποδείκνυμι 
simply as an unexceptional term for disclosure, when Xenophanes denies that the 
gods revealed (ὑπέδειξαν) all things from the outset he implies, or at least allows, 
that they did reveal (ὑπέδειξαν) some things at some times.³ It is universally held, 
then, that we can only attribute a notion of divine disclosure to Xenophanes if we 
maintain that the temporal and extensional markers, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς and πάντα, imply 
or permit that the gods did ὑπέδειξαν some things at some times.⁴ 
This set-up is misleading in failing to recognise that, in addition to the afore-
mentioned temporal and extensional qualifications, Xenophanes also qualifies 
the manner in which, according to the view he rejects, the gods disclose things 
(ὑπέδειξαν). These qualifications, I will argue, do not restrict a rejection of divine 
disclosure as such. Rather, they combine to express a particular notion of divine 
disclosure, which Xenophanes rejects. That is, Xenophanes argues that the gods 
never disclosed anything in the manner in which the view negated in B18.1 con-
ceives of disclosure. A consideration of these points, and of B36, will suggest that 
1 Adopting Lesher’s rendering, (1992), p. 27. I will presently discuss ὑπέδειξαν in detail.
2 Gomperz (1906), p. 162; Kleingü nther (1933), p. 41; Loenen (1956); Dodds (1973), p. 4; Lesher 
(1983, 1991, 1992), see below, p. 259, with n. 41 (Lesher allows non-revelatory divine aid, e.g. 
Lesher 1991, p. 246); McKirahan (1994), pp. 68f; Curd (2002), p. 129; Mogyoródi (2006), p. 126f.
3 Shorey (1911); Verdenius (1955); Barnes (1982), p. 140; Tulin (1993), pp. 133–135, Robinson 
(2008), p. 489.
4 N.B. Lesher’s exposition of the views that have been and can be taken, (1991), p. 230. 
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Xenophanes neither allows that the gods did intimate (ὑπέδειξαν) some things 
at some times (following tenet (i) of the majority reading against the minority 
reading) nor denies divine disclosure categorically (contrary to tenet (ii) of the 
majority reading). Rather, he rejects specifically what he takes to be the tradi-
tional view, that from the beginning the gods intimated (ὑπέδειξαν) everything, 
as a theologically faulty conception of the nature of divine disclosure, and sup-
plants that conception with his own, alternative notion of disclosure.
Having argued that Xenophanes developed a conception of divine disclosure, 
I will offer some further suggestions concerning its function and characteristics. 
Xenophanean disclosure, I will argue, is pointedly demarcated from poetic inspi-
ration and mantic communication and is not such as to enable mortals to procure 
certain knowledge. Here I follow Lesher’s (1983) convincing and neglected argu-
ment that Xenophanes arrives at the negative aspects of his epistemology, his 
scepticism,⁵ by rejecting traditional divinatory assumptions (B34). But Lesher, 
I believe, tells only half the story. On Xenophanes’ alternative model of disclo-
sure, I will argue, the divine purposively facilitates mortal belief-formation and 
mortal inquiry. Xenophanes’ own model of disclosure, in other words, underlies 
his positive views regarding what does lie within the scope of mortal epistemol-
ogy. More speculatively, I develop two alternative interpretations of the precise 
notion of purposiveness which underlies Xenophanean disclosure. Most proba-
bly, Xenophanes reconceptualises the notion of divine disclosure radically as the 
view that the divine purposively facilitates all mortal experience and belief-forma-
tion as part of its intelligent direction of the cosmos and its inhabitants. Another, 
somewhat less likely, possibility is that Xenophanes maintains less idiosyncrati-
cally that the divine guides particular mortals in particular circumstances.
Cicero speaks of Xenophanes as the only one among the most ancient philos-
ophers who, while asserting the existence of the gods, did away with divination 
from its very foundation: diuinationem funditus sustulit (De div. I.3.5, A52).⁶ Lesher 
5 Understood non-technically as an epistemological attitude that considers knowledge over cer-
tain domains unattainable by mortals, Lesher (1983), pp. 20ff; cf. Mogyoródi (2006), p. 127, n.12.
6 Cf. Aëtius: Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀναιροῦσι τὴν μαντικήν. (V.1.2 = A52). Since Cicero’s diui-
natio translates the Greek μαντική (De div. I.1.1), and given both the parallelism of sustulit and 
ἀναιροῦσι, and the recurrent association of Xenophanes and Epicurus, we may assume that Ci-
cero and Aë tius draw on a common source. The two passages give parallel accounts also of the 
Stoic (V.1.1; De div. I.3.6) and Peripatetic (V.1.4; De div. I.3.5) views. It is impossible to determine 
whether their common source drew on some lost lines (the extant fragments contain no cognate 
of the word μαντική) or perhaps pounced on B18 itself in his doxographic eagerness to identify 
a straightforward rejection of divination which could be opposed (as in Cicero De div. I.3.5f and 
Diels’ Aëtius V.1) to its otherwise universal acceptance.
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(1992), who notes several times his acceptance of A52 as a faithful report, cites 
favourably Dodds’ evaluation of the implications of such acceptance: “If this is 
true, it means that, almost alone among classical Greek thinkers, he [Xenophanes] 
swept aside not only the pseudo-science of reading omens but the whole deep-
seated complex of ideas about inspiration.”⁷ Both earlier and later commentators 
on Xenophanes’ relation to traditional theology similarly echo Cicero’s talk of a 
traceless rejection.⁸ Indeed, most modern scholars were all too happy to inherit 
a Xenophanes who champions independent mortal inquiry against revelation.⁹ 
Although I will agree that Xenophanes indeed repudiated divination, I will ask, 
finally, how my interpretation of his epistemology may lend nuance to our under-
standing of the complexity of his engagement with the culturally and theologi-
cally dominant mantic model of divine disclosure. 
*
In epic poetry, δείκνυμι can signify divine disclosure, but never with the prefix 
ὑπό.¹⁰ In archaic and classical Greek, ὑποδείκνυμι only very rarely describes 
divine actions towards mortals; its signification of a notion of divine disclosure to 
mortals in Xenophanes (θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν) is, to my knowledge, unique in 
these periods. Lesher thus rightly emphasises the prefix in ὑπέδειξαν, which, he 
argues, indicates an indirect, cryptic and possibly underhand kind of disclosure. 
Lesher also, however, misleadingly downplays the peculiarity and distinctive-
ness of Xenophanes’ terminology.¹¹ He argues (1991) that a passage in Xenophon 
(Mem. IV.3.13) suggests that the usage of ὑποδείκνυμι in the context of divine rela-
tionship with mortals was entirely appropriate and cites (1992) the same passage 
as a parallel usage of the verb to express divine communication.¹² A closer 
7 Dodds (1951), p. 181 (cf. Dodds 1973, p. 6); cited at Lesher (1992), p. 141. 
8 E.g. “a clean sweep of all the elements of popular belief which were hostile to his higher stan-
dard” (Gomperz 1906, p. 163), “Xenophanes schaltet die Gö tter im Einklang mit seiner Theolo-
gie vö llig aus” (Kleingü nther 1933, p. 41), “the entire framework … is here swept away” (Hussey 
1990, p. 19), cf. Schrödinger (“clear away”, Schrödinger 1954, p. 68); on divination: “par la base” 
(Bouché-Leclercq 1879–1882, p. 33); “altogether” (Flower 2008, p. 8) (my emphases).
9 Tellingly, Loenen (1956) styles Xenophanes an “enlightened critic” when defending the ma-
jority reading of B18.1 (p. 136; cf. Gomperz 1906, p. 163; Dodds 1973, pp. 4f), while Shorey (1911), 
arguing for the minority reading, speculates that scholars have been “misled by … partiality for 
the pre-Socratics” (p. 89); more recently, cf. Lesher (2008), pp. 468f; Curd (2002), pp. 120–129. 
10 Il. XIII.243f; Od. III.173f; cf. Op. 448–451; Pind. fr.131b M; also, Hdt. I.209; VII.37 (προ-).
11 Lesher (1991), p. 237, n.19; (1992), p. 153.
12 Lesher (1991), p. 238. As parallels for B18.1, Lesher (1992, p. 153) lists passages in which he 
says the operative verb for divine communication is δείκνυμι or one of its compounds (with ὑπό 
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look at the context, however, reveals that divine disclosure is not at issue here. 
Rather, the gods imply indirectly (ὑποδεικνύουσιν) a certain precept about proper 
worship (that mortals should honour them even though they cannot see them) 
simply through the discreet manner in which they benefit mortals without reveal-
ing themselves openly.¹³ Herodotus, offering another rare and similarly pointed 
use of ὑποδείκνυμι to describe the behaviour of the divine towards mortals, writes 
that god gives many mortals a show of blessedness (πολλοῖσι … ὑποδέξας ὄλβον 
ὁ θεός), before ruining them utterly (I.32). The passage demonstrates the sinister 
undertones of the verb, but it is clear from context that the ‘showing’ in question 
consists simply in the mortal’s happiness prior to calamity and is unrelated to 
anything like divine communication.
Though neither passage offers a straightforward parallel, Xenophon supports 
Lesher’s identification of the notion of indirectness in ὑπέδειξαν, while Herodotus 
shows that the verb can naturally connote suspicion or even criticism in descrip-
tions of divine behaviour.¹⁴ Though not invariably, such connotations, as well as 
those of cryptic secretiveness, regularly characterise the prefix and other occur-
rences of the compound.¹⁵ More generally, both Herodotus and Xenophon use 
ὑποδείκνυμι in a pointed way in their descriptions of divine behaviour. They do 
not use the verb as a mere synonym for δείκνυμι.
Crucially, the terminological novelty of ὑπέδειξαν notwithstanding, Xeno-
phanes does employ this exceptional vocabulary to signify a notion of divine dis-
closure. The issue at stake is how mortals come to discover what they discover. 
Xenophanes regards the kind of divine intimation which he rejects as mutually 
exclusive with his prescription of temporally protracted inquiries. Whatever else, 
such inquiries clearly extend for Xenophanes to the business of forming and assess-
ing beliefs. Thus, for example, Xenophanes’ observations (whether first-hand or 
not) about marine fossils found inland support his novel theory of the earth’s sub-
or πρό). Other than Xen. Mem. IV.3.13, however, ὑποδείκνυμι occurs in none of the other passages 
listed by Lesher (I could not find any form of δείκνυμι in Hes. Op. 825–828; h.Hom. 32.13; h.Hom. 
33.14–16; h.Hom. 4.525ff; Pind. Paean 9; Thuc. VII.50). 
13 The benefits in question extend to providential actions quite generally (τἀγαθὰ διδόντες), 
and cannot be restricted to divine disclosure, which is referred to earlier with unexceptional 
vocabulary as one instance of such benefits (διὰ μαντικῆς … φράζοντας, Mem. IV.3.12).
14 Cf. ‘feigning virtue’, Thuc. IV.86.5.
15 LSJ, sv. ὑπό, F, III; Smyth (1972), p. 388; cf. e.g. Il. XXI.44. In a scholion on Lycoph. 344, 
φρυκτὸν ὑποδείξας signifies Sinon’s secret disclosure of a signal to the Greeks (Lesher 1992, p. 
153). In literary criticism, again, ὑποδείκνυμι came to signify that an inexplicit poetic text indi-
rectly implies certain distinctions or insights (Plut. Mor. 23e1; 645a5) or even elaborate philoso-
phical doctrines (e.g. ps.-Plut. de Hom.2 1063–1074, 1298–1308 Kindstrand).
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mersion (A33, 32) and, perhaps, its preferability to Anaximander’s theory of desic-
cation (DK12 A27).¹⁶ Correspondingly, B18.1 must articulate a notion of disclosure 
which, whatever else, purports to offer an instant access to truths, which conflicts 
with the call to search for them through such temporally protracted inquiries.¹⁷
The negated view conceives of disclosure as an indirect, secretive and cryptic 
affair. Furthermore, in this manner the gods disclosed everything (πάντα) from 
the beginning (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς). Given Xenophanes’ qualification of the manner of dis-
closure, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς and πάντα do not restrict a rejection of disclosure simpliciter, 
but further qualify the notion of indirect, cryptic disclosure which Xenophanes 
rejects. That is, Xenophanes does not reject severally the isolated claims that the 
gods disclosed (i) from the beginning, (ii) everything and (iii) cryptically. Rather, 
the qualifications (i)–(iii) combine to express a unified view of how disclosure 
works, i.e. the view that from the beginning gods cryptically disclosed every-
thing, which Xenophanes rejects.
Lesher identifies omen-divination as the target of Xenophanes’ attack, which 
he extends to a general rejection of the postulation of divine communication.¹⁸ 
We need not identify the notion of divine disclosure negated in B18.1 with omen-
divination or divination generally. Elsewhere too, however, Xenophanes’ theo-
logical criticisms (as in B14) confront pervasive and authoritative traditional sup-
positions and it is very likely that B18.1 conveys, inter alia, a polemical attitude 
to this most dominant form of divine disclosure. Furthermore, the connotation 
in ὑπέδειξαν of indirect, cryptic disclosure is highly apposite as a critical repre-
sentation of mantic communication. Omens, such as birds and lightning, com-
municated propositions indirectly and cryptically, and Greek tradition abounds 
with the didactic tragedies of consultants who failed to realise that oracles too 
are to be decoded and do not signify propositions in a direct and straightforward 
manner.¹⁹ The term πάντα (B18.1) is also instructive. πάντα is here unqualified 
and open-ended. The force of ‘all things’ or ‘everything’ in Xenophanes is else-
where context-sensitive. At different junctures, πάντα may refer to all things (B27, 
16 For the contrast with Anaximander, cf. Mogyoródi (2006), p. 134, n.40; cf. KRS (1983), pp. 177f.
17 As Montiglio shows, the Odyssean conception of the expansion of learning and wisdom 
through wandering became a central methodological tenet among proponents of Ionian historiê, 
(2000), pp. 88–90; (2005), pp. 100f, pp. 123–146. Lesher’s reading of ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον as 
a better method of discovering (i.e. Ionian historiê, Lesher 1991, pp. 244–246; Lesher 1992, p. 153) 
highlights a likely connotation, but it seems implausible to exclude a corresponding notion of 
improved results.
18 Lesher (1991), pp. 240, 237f. 
19 Epaminondas, for one, was warned to avoid the sea and met his end in a wood called Πέλα-
γος, Parke and Wormell (1956), no.258. I revert to this feature of divination below.
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if authentic) or all members of a subset of things (B29) which undergo natural 
processes, to everything (or perhaps every sort of thing) censured among mortals 
(B11.1²⁰) and to every item in a foregoing catalogue of public honours (B2.10).²¹ 
The gods’ disclosure of ‘everything’ to mortals could certainly encompass such 
divinely inspired accounts of the world which are universal in scope as Hesiod’s 
Theogony.²² But the indirect, cryptic disclosure of ‘everything’, and especially the 
emphatic contrast with inquiries over time, again point also to a preoccupation 
with divination. For Xenophanes, mortals must conduct protracted inquiries in 
the hope only for gradual, hard-won advances. The notion of disclosure negated 
in B18.1 competes with Xenophanes’ call for such inquiries in B18.2 because, on 
this notion, the gods always made everything instantly available to humans, and 
so every object of human inquiry which was not already independently avail-
able to them. πάντα aptly conveys the entirely unrestricted range of questions 
– encompassing any truth – concerning which, traditionally, the gods always 
communicated to mortals.²³ It is an important point here that, as Lesher persua-
sively argues, the Greek term ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς signifies, not “(once) at the outset”, but 
“from the outset onwards”.²⁴ Correspondingly, the aorist tense of ὑπέδειξαν does 
not entail the bizarre view that, on some single, primordial occasion, gods just 
once made a one-off revelation to mortals, but then ceased making revelations 
to mortals. Rather, the aorist ὑπέδειξαν, coupled with ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, indicates that, 
right from the outset of the mortal-divine relationship, and similarly onwards (ἀπ’ 
ἀρχῆς), gods rendered instantly available to mortals ‘everything’, including any 
truth that they wished to attain. This view, that “from the outset onwards gods 
intimated everything to mortals” (B18.1), is mutually exclusive with Xenophanes’ 
20 Xenophanes’ catalogue of blameworthy actions is certainly not exhaustive; Lesher renders 
“all sorts of things”, (1992), p. 23.
21 I discuss περὶ πάντων in B34.2 below, p. 261. 
22 Cf. Koning, (2010), p. 204.
23 Including, for example, events in the past or future (“who will win the Trojan war?”, Il. 
II.303–330; “were Agis’ blankets and pillows stolen?”, Parke 1967, p. 272, no.27), current facts 
unknowable due to practical limitations (“how many figs are in this fig tree?”, Hes. fr.278 MW; 
“is Lysanias the father of Annyla’s unborn child?”, Parke 1967, p. 266, no.11) and questions essen-
tially non-amenable to autopsy (“what does Zeus will?”, h.Hom. 3.131f; “what actions incurred 
divine wrath and which would allay it?”, Il. I.92–100). Apollo famously responded to Chaerephon 
that no man is wiser than Socrates (Pl. Apol. 21a), while, in Philostratus’ biography, Apollonius 
of Tyana inquires which is the most perfect and pure philosophy and is delighted to discover that 
Trophonius endorses Pythagoreanism (Philost. VA. 8.19.40–44).
24 Lesher (1991), pp. 232f; see LSJ sv. ἀπό II; cf. Hes. Th. 425; Hdt. II.50, 104, 113; Gorg. B11a.29. 
Classen (1996) shows that Homer and Hesiod consistently use ἀρχή, especially with the preposi-
tions ἐξ or ἀπό, in this same sense. 
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call for temporally protracted inquiries (B18.2) only because, on this view, gods 
still now render instantly available to mortals any object of inquiry which is not 
independently instantly available to them.²⁵ In addition to Cicero’s aforemen-
tioned explicit report that Xenophanes rejected divination (A52), Xenophanes’ 
cosmology also supports the suggestion that B18.1 conveys a polemical attitude to 
(inter alia) divination. In the epic tradition, Iris the messenger (e.g. Il. XV.158f; Th. 
780f) is standardly represented as an omen sent by Zeus (Il. XI.27f; Il. XVII.547f). 
Xenophanes’ assertion, “she whom they call Iris, this too is by nature a cloud” 
(B32), is thus plausibly read as a deflationary reduction of a phenomenon com-
monly regarded as a portentous deity.²⁶ Similar reductions of a variety of atmo-
spheric phenomena, several related to omen-divination, could also relate to a 
denial that such phenomena constitute encoded divine communications.²⁷
We need not, I noted, delimit Xenophanes’ criticism in B18.1 to mantic com-
munication. A poet of the Hymns describes the disclosure of the deeds of heroes 
with the words θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν (h.Hom. 31.19). Using the usually mantic 
δείκνυμι,²⁸ the poet offers an almost verbatim and surprisingly disregarded par-
allel to Xenophanes’ θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν. Xenophanes, in employing the very 
same phrase, with the conspicuous addition of ὑπ-, may thus be reacting criti-
cally also to the elusive notion of poetic inspiration, itself, as in h.Hom. 31.19, 
often closely associated with the discourse of divination.²⁹ Indeed, I do not 
25 We may usefully compare here Xenophanes’ use of the aorist in B38: “If god had not made 
[or ‘caused to grow’: ἔφυσε] yellow honey, they would have said that figs were much sweeter”. 
It would be rather improbable to read into this statement an elaborate and confusingly com-
pressed deist thesis that, on some single, primordial occasion, god established certain mecha-
nisms which now cause the generation of yellow honey without any further divine ministra-
tion. The fragment much more naturally conveys the view that, for as long as there had been 
yellow honey, god caused the generation of yellow honey, and still now causes it. Confirmation 
of this interpretation of B38, which I take to be independently more plausible, is found in B25 
(discussed below), which shows that god’s intelligent and purposeful ministration of the cosmos 
is an ongoing affair: “But without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind”. Compare 
also Hdt. I.32 (above, p. 252), where the aorist participle ὑποδέξας conveys that god gave a show 
of blessedness to doomed mortals, not simply once, but right up to destroying them.
26 Dodds (1951), p. 196, n.7; Lesher (1991), p. 241; (1992), pp. 139–144; cf. (1983), pp. 27–29.
27 Clouds in the ordinary sense (A46, B30), lightning (A45), comets, shooting stars (A44), the 
moon (A43), the stars (A38), St. Elmo’s fire (note: οὓς καὶ Διοσκούρους καλοῦσί τινες, νεφέλια 
εἶναι, A39); See Lesher, loc. cit.; Hussey (1990), p. 24; Mourelatos (1989), pp. 282f, 285; (2008), 
pp. 135–137, 149f; KRS (1983), p. 174. 
28 Above, n. 10.
29 A famous illustration of the connection between poetry and divination is the echo between 
Hes. Th. 32, 38 and Il. I.69f; see further Dodds (1951), pp. 80–82; Chadwick (1942), passim; note 
Flower’s qualifications, (2008), p. 78.
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believe that my argument requires me to exclude the possibility that Xenophanes 
is also implying that the gods did not instantly bestow all the cultural and mate-
rial prosperity which we now have (B18.1) and that we progress culturally and 
materially over time (B18.2). Lesher’s arguments against this reading are plau-
sible but not conclusive.³⁰ The important point for us is that, however wide a net 
Xenophanes casts in B18.1, the line’s language, its opposition to the alternative 
of temporally protracted inquiries and Xenophanes’ polemical cosmology and 
reported rejection of divination all indicate that his invective against a notion of 
divine disclosure here conveys a polemical attitude against traditional, authorita-
tive paradigms of disclosure, prominently including mantic communication and 
probably poetic inspiration.
If, therefore, ὑπέδειξαν evokes traditional paradigms of divine disclosure, 
and if Xenophanes bore a polemical attitude to these paradigms (a point further 
supported by the discussion of B34 below), we may follow the majority reading 
of B18.1 to this extent: Xenophanes is unlikely to have allowed that the gods did 
intimate to mortals cryptically and indirectly some things at some points, agree-
ing with the criticised view about the manner of disclosure (ὑπέδειξαν), while 
disagreeing only about its temporal and quantitative scope. Equally, however, 
Xenophanes is unlikely to be rejecting divine disclosure categorically. The central 
objection of the minority reading remains persuasive. Xenophanes carefully for-
mulates a highly qualified view and it is implausible to return to him the same 
view divested of those qualifications. Instead of following standard terminology 
(say, θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν, as in h.Hom. 31.19), Xenophanes chose a pointedly 
exceptional term for disclosure, which highlights the notions of indirect, cryptic 
or secretive intimation. ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς and πάντα, furthermore, are indeed emphatic 
qualifications. Rejecting the view that from the beginning the gods disclosed 
everything in an indirect and cryptic manner, while a pointed critical represen-
tation of traditional conceptions of disclosure, would be a remarkably peculiar 
way of stating that the gods never and in no way disclosed anything to mortals. 
Fortunately, we have evidence, I believe, that Xenophanes did in fact formulate 
an alternative:
ὁππόσα δὴ θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι (B36).
30 Lesher reasonably points out that Xenophanes is acutely aware of socially destructive prac-
tices, developments and authorities (B1–3, 10–12); (1991), pp. 231–237; (1992), pp. 151f. Note, 
though, that Herodotus does speak of god as (misleadingly) ‘intimating’ a flourishing state: 
ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεός, I.32.
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It is, in fact, difficult to determine whether πεφήνασιν should be read transitively 
or intransitively. I will argue, however, that, on either construal, these words are 
best interpreted as conveying a notion of divine disclosure. Although we would 
otherwise expect the second perfect of φαίνω to carry an intransitive sense 
(“however many things have appeared for mortals to look upon”³¹), this is at least 
balanced by the consideration that such a reading of B36 would leave us with 
ὁππόσα as a neuter nominative taking a plural verb, a usage of ὁπ(π)όσα for which 
there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in extant archaic and classical Greek.³² In 
B18.1, moreover, θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν is transitive, which perhaps suggests a cor-
respondingly transitive sense for the structurally parallel θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν: 
“however many things they have disclosed for mortals to look upon”.³³ On either 
grammatical construal, however, given the interpretation of B18.1 advanced 
above, B36, read as expressing some notion of divine disclosure, would answer 
our independent expectation for Xenophanes to articulate such a notion which 
is not tainted by the characteristics of the highly qualified notion of disclosure 
which he rejects in B18.1. This is especially so if, as I will presently argue, the 
account of mortal experiences in B36 (to put it in a way which accommodates 
both the transitive and the intransitive construals of πεφήνασιν) precisely inverts 
the account rejected in B18.1. With this last consideration in mind, we would still 
plausibly maintain that πεφήνασιν refers implicitly to the agency that underlies 
mortal experiences even if we construe it intransitively (with ὁππόσα very pecu-
liarly as its subject). Herodotus (IX.120) offers an instructive parallel.³⁴ We could 
read πέφηνε here intransitively (“Athenian stranger, do not fear this portent, for 
[sc. it] has not appeared to you (πέφηνε), but it is to me that Protesilaus of Elaeus 
signifies that …”) or transitively (“for Protesilaus of Elaeus has not shown [sc. it] 
to you (πέφηνε), but it is to me that he signifies that …”). On either construal, the 
passage would still demonstrate how naturally this terminology can signify that 
certain appearances (ὁππόσα, B36; τὸ τέρας τοῦτο, Hdt. IX.120) have appeared 
to their recipients (θνητοῖσι, B36; ἐμοί, Hdt. IX.120) at the instigation of a divine 
power.
31 Similarly translated e.g. by DK, ad loc; Burnet (1930), p. 121; Edmonds (1931), ad loc; Guthrie 
(1962), p. 397; noted as possible by Lesher (1992), p. 177.
32 A TLG search of all occurrences of ὁππόσα and ὁπόσα in texts up to and including Aristotle 
indicates that the term is far more often accusative (as in Il. XXIV.7; Od. XIV.47) and, when nomi-
native, invariably takes, as one would expect, a singular verb (e.g. h.Hom. 2.365; Hes. fr.204.113 
MW). 
33 Similarly translated e.g. by Lesher (1992), p. 39; Barnes (1982), p. 140.
34 ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, μηδὲν φοβέο τὸ τέρας τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ πέφηνε, ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ σημαίνει ὁ ἐν 
Ἐλαιοῦντι Πρωτεσίλεως ὅτι κτλ.
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If πεφήνασιν is transitive, ‘Gods’ is, of course, the only candidate for the 
subject. As Lesher (1992) himself points out, who else could make things evident 
to ‘mortals’ if not the immortals (cf. θεοὶ θνητοῖς, B18.1)?³⁵ We may further 
support the impression that the verb likely expresses a notion of disclosure even 
if it carries an intransitive sense by raising and addressing the following ques-
tion: should we read B36 as a whole as the fragment of a statement made in 
propria persona? First, we have no reason not to take B36 in this way. Since it is 
undeniable that Xenophanes employs polytheistic language positively, attribu-
tions of theorised monotheism, themselves derived from a questionable reading 
of B23, pose no obstacles.³⁶ Hussey’s claim that the particle δή is “distancing … 
which suggests irony and/or quotation of others’ views” betrays desperation.³⁷ 
More importantly, we do have reason to read B36 positively, for, I argue, the posi-
tive account of mortal experiences in B36 is the reversal of the view negated in 
the polemical B18.1. The verb φαίνω is the standard, bland term for divine dis-
closure and conveys none of the pointed undertones of the language of B18.1 
(ὑπέδειξαν).³⁸ The denial that the gods intimated everything (πάντα … θνητοῖς) 
is fittingly balanced by a statement concerning the scope of what the gods have 
disclosed (ὁππόσα δὴ θνητοῖσι). Finally, if in B18.1 Xenophanes rejects the view 
that from the beginning the gods intimated everything (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς), his talk in B36 
of however many things the gods have disclosed allows that the current set of 
disclosed things may vary.³⁹ Since, therefore, B18.1 rejects only a very particu-
35 Lesher (1992), p. 176f.
36 I take no issue with the view of Xenophanes’ theology as incipiently monotheistic insofar as 
it may imply a reconceptualisation of the divine as the greatest god (B23–26, see Schofield 1997, 
p. 72f) even if the rendering of εἷς θεός κτλ as “there is one god” is itself highly improbable (see 
Stokes 1971, pp. 76–78). The important point for us is that such tendencies cannot warrant the 
suppression of B36 because of its polytheistic language (on the transitive reading of πεφήνασιν) 
in a thinker who uses both polytheistic and monotheistic language apparently interchangeably 
when speaking positively about the divine (esp. B1.24; cf. B34.2 and, more contentiously, B18, 
B11f, B14–16). This fact itself problematises ascriptions of full-fledged monotheism. As Schofield 
suggested to me, Xenophanes most probably remained vague on the numerical question. In-
deed, for a card-carrying monotheist, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι (B23) would be a terrifically 
ill-formulated and misleading phrase; cf. Guthrie (1962), p. 375; Vlastos (1970), p. 94, n.8; Broadie 
(1999), p. 210.
37 Hussey (1990), p. 25, n.37.
38 E.g. Il. II.308, 318, 324, 353; Il. IV.381; Od. III.173f; Od. XXI.413; cf. also Hdt. IX.120 (πέφηνε), 
cited above, n. 34. 
39 This, we shall see, is significant given Xenophanes’ engagement (discussed below) with the 
possibility that the available body of evidence may change and that counter-evidence may be 
discovered.
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lar notion of divine disclosure with carefully qualified characteristics, and since 
B36 constitutes a precise reversal of this notion of disclosure, the latter fragment 
most likely either implies (if πεφήνασιν is intransitive) or refers to (if πεφήνασιν 
is transitive) an alternative notion of disclosure which is precisely innocent of 
those same characteristics. The notion of disclosure advanced in B36 (θνητοῖσι 
πεφήνασιν) supplants the one rejected in B18.1 (θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν).
Both majority and minority interpreters have disregarded B36 when discussing 
B18 and Xenophanes’ views on divine disclosure.⁴⁰ Indeed, Lesher considers B36 
a statement made in propria persona, reads ‘gods’ as the subject, recognises that 
the fragment implies divine influence on mortal inquiry, and yet does not revise 
his (majority) reading of B18.1, i.e. his view that Xenophanes rejected categori-
cally the notion of divine disclosure.⁴¹ The carefully qualified B18.1, however, 
criticises a highly specific notion of disclosure, while B36 advances an alterna-
tive notion. Xenophanes, it follows, did not merely admit that in some undefined 
sense the divine influences mortal inquiry, but explicitly represented that influ-
ence as a form of divine disclosure. Contra Lesher, B18.1 is not “a firmly nega-
tive comment […] on the question of divine agency”, but a firm rejection of one 
particular conception of divine agency.⁴² We must, then, employ more nuanced 
vocabulary. We cannot speak of Xenophanes’ position on disclosure simpliciter. 
Rather, Xenophanes replaces what he takes to be the traditional view with his 
own, alternative conception.
*
40 A stimulating exception: Barnes observes, without further comment, that B18 is comple-
mented by B36 (1982, p. 140). The common assertion that disclosure “is not the sort of thing 
Xenophanes’ god … does” (McKirahan 1994, pp. 68f; cf. Mogyoródi 2006, p. 144; Wardle 2006, 
p. 107) perhaps discouraged recognition that B36 may express an alternative, novel notion of 
disclosure.
41 Lesher (1991), pp. 243, n.32; 246, n.45 (on B36); 230, with 231, n.6 and 242, n.29 (on disclosure). 
Lesher (1992) raises parenthetically in a laconic question the possibility that B36 and B38 may 
suggest a role for divine agency in the inquiry advocated in B18.2 (p. 152). Despite recognising 
that B36 suggests divine influence on the formation of mortal beliefs (see pp. 5, 157, 178f), he 
does not consider its ramifications for his previous account of Xenophanes’ reaction to notions 
of divination and disclosure (pp. 153–155) nor revisits B18 in his commentaries on B36 and B38 
(pp. 176–182); cf. Lesher (1983), pp. 40, n.39 (on B36), 23 (on disclosure); Mogyoródi (2006), pp. 
149, n.84 (on B36), 127 (on disclosure).
42 Lesher (1991), p. 233.
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What else, then, can we say about this alternative conception?
Let us first ask what Xenophanean disclosure will not be. It will not amount 
to traditional mantic communication, i.e. the signification of true propositions 
concerning any matter by the disclosure of objects which possess non-natural 
meaning,⁴³ or to poetic inspiration. The gods do not infuse Xenophanes with 
song nor communicate messages cryptically through signs. Since, furthermore, 
Xenophanes maintains that, concerning certain matters, mortals cannot attain 
clear and certain knowledge (B34), Xenophanean disclosure could not guarantee 
such knowledge. B34 demands closer analysis, but one that will nonetheless be 
necessarily brief and selective: I cannot, of course, address here adequately the 
numerous controversies surrounding the fragment.
And that which is clear and certain (τὸ … σαφές) no man has seen nor will there be anyone
who knows about the gods and what I say about all things;
for even if, in the best case, someone succeeded in speaking what has been fulfilled 
(τετελεσμένον),
still he himself does not know; but belief is fashioned for all.
τὸ σαφές, that which Xenophanes denies any man knows “about the gods and 
what I say about all things”, indicates veracity, clarity, and certitude.⁴⁴ Numerous, 
generically heterogeneous texts associate this terminology with the knowledge, 
pronouncements or, once, person of the mantis.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Lesher convinc-
ingly highlights the sense of ‘that which has come to completion or fulfilment’ 
in τετελεσμένον, Xenophanes’ term for the object of true statements and beliefs 
(but not thereby knowledge), and the term’s provenance in Homeric divination.⁴⁶ 
Diviners, indeed, inquire above all into the disposition and will of the gods 
(e.g. h.Hom. 3.131f, 539a), the fruition of whose designs is standardly expressed 
as their arrival at their telos.⁴⁷ The same terminology is used formulaically for 
43 Cf. Denyer: “[omens] mean the facts they signify, not in the way clouds mean rain, but in the 
way that a road sign means a bridge ahead”, (1985), p. 5.
44 See Lesher (1992), pp. 156f; Fränkel (1974), p. 127, n.35; Lesher (1983), p.31; S.E. M. VII.50. 
45 Lesher (1983), p. 31 cites Il. XII.228f (σάφα θυμῷ εἰδείη); Od. I.202 (μάντις … οἰωνῶν σάφα 
εἰδώς) and XVII.153 (οὐ σάφα οἶδεν, Theoclymenus contrasting his own divinatory knowledge 
with Telemachus’ ignorance). Cf. e.g. Soph. Philoc. 1338; OT. 285f, 390 (of the diviner him-
self, cf. Lesher 1983, p. 39, n.34); Eur. Hipp. 346; fr.482.2 Nauck; note especially fr.795 Nauck; 
Hdt. VII.228; playfully at Pl. Phdr. 242c3–6; Rep. 523a8 (cf. also Phd. 69d4–6; Ti. 72b7–c1). 
46 Lesher (1983), pp. 29f; (1992), p. 158.
47 E.g. Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή, Il. I.5; cf. Th. 402f; Op. 83; h.Hom. 4.10; h.Hom. 2.323; cf. Darcus 
(1978), p. 32; Darcus (1995), pp. 36f. 
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the formation and fulfilment of mantic predictions.⁴⁸ In the Iliad and Odyssey, 
τετελεσμένον is invariably associated with statements concerning future states-
of-affairs.⁴⁹ In the formula τελέσαι δέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, εἰ δύναμαι τελέσαι γε 
καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστίν, the concluding phrase carries the force ‘if it is to be 
fulfilled’.⁵⁰ More pointedly, the formula αἲ γὰρ τοῦτο, ξεῖνε, ἔπος τετελεσμένον 
εἴη expresses the desire to see a prediction come to pass and is addressed twice 
to the seer Theoclymenus (Od. XV.536; Od. XVII.163, where Theoclymenus had 
just claimed sure, mantic knowledge: σάφα, Od. XVII.153f) and once to Odysseus 
upon his ‘prediction’ of his own imminent arrival (Od. XIX.309). In Od. XIX.547, 
the eagle-Odysseus, undertaking the role of oneiropolos, employs the term when 
divining from Penelope’s dream of the slaughtered geese (ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον 
ἔσται). Xenophanes, of course, appropriates and employs this Homeric notion of 
‘that which has been fulfilled’ more broadly as the object of all unknowledgeable 
true statements and beliefs “about the gods and what I say about all things”.
By highlighting the scope of the matters to which his denial of knowledge 
refers – “about the gods and what I say about all things” – Xenophanes demon-
strates that, at this juncture, when formulating the essential limitations of mortal 
epistemology, he is concerned in particular with mortal statements about non-
everyday, non-pedestrian, non-experienced matters.⁵¹ The phrase ‘about the gods’ 
reflects this emphasis in itself. “What I say about all things” (ἅσσα … πάντων), 
furthermore, is unlikely to signify ‘all statements’ unqualifiedly, since, if ‘all 
things’ (πάντων) includes the gods, their separate mention becomes curious. The 
phrase thus more likely signifies cosmological universal generalisations⁵² or, 
since πάντα can refer to more than just cosmic processes (B11.1; B2.10), perhaps 
universal generalisations as such. Furthermore, Xenophanes’ insistence that no 
mortal has ‘seen’ the clear and certain truth, and that even the one who possesses 
48 μαντεύσομαι … ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀΐω (Od. I.200–202; Od. XV.173f); τὰ δὴ νῦν πάντα τελεῖται (Il. 
II.330; Od. II.176; Od. V.302; Od. XIII.178; cf. Il. XIV.48; Od. XVIII.271); Zeus’ eagle is, qua omen, 
τελειότατον πετεηνῶν (Il. VIII.247; Il. XXIV.315); note τετελεσμένον as divinely ‘appointed’, 
h.Hom. 4.572; cf. Op. 799. 
49 The most common formula (14 occurrences) is ἐρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται (vel sim.), 
used especially for threats and promises, e.g. Il. I.212; Il. VIII.401; Od. II.187; cf. Il. IX.310.
50 Il. XIV.195f; Il. XVIII.426f; Od. V.89f.
51 Cf. Lesher (1991), p. 236. Both Epiphanius and Sextus observe this emphasis: μάλιστα τῶν 
ἀφανέων (Epiph. Advers. Haeres. II.2.9 = DG, p.590); τό γε ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις (M. VII.51).
52 So Gomperz (1906), p. 164; Barnes (1982), p. 139; Lesher (1992), pp. 167f; Mogyoródi (2006), 
pp. 132f; cf. B29 (πάντ’ … ὅσα γίνοντ’ κτλ) and, if its authenticity is accepted, B27 (πάντα – on the 
question of authenticity, see Guthrie (1962), pp. 383–387; Lesher (1992), p. 127; Stokes (1971), p. 
84; Freeman (1946), p. 100). 
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true belief does not himself know (αὐτός), suggests a concern with the unavail-
ability of personal experience or cognition, and that our inability to speak knowl-
edgeably about such matters is related to our inability, in these cases, to consider 
directly and fully the body of evidence which bears on our statements.⁵³
Mantic disclosure was a, if not the, culturally predominant paradigm 
of attaining knowledge about non-experienced matters⁵⁴ and, in particular, 
about the gods.⁵⁵ As Lesher (1983) argues, moreover, in pointing out that even 
the hypothetical best-case-scenario of a true statement does not imply sure, 
personal knowledge, Xenophanes undermines what could seem the strongest 
case for mantic knowledge claims, namely divination’s purported track record 
(e.g. Pl. Euthyph. 3c (note περὶ τῶν θείων); Cic. De div. I.13.23).⁵⁶ Xenophanes’ 
criticism is further supported by the tension, inherent in the divinatory system 
itself, between mantic knowledge claims and the widespread recognition of the 
conjectural status of individual mantic statements (discussed below, pp. 274f.). 
Nonetheless, and despite Xenophanes’ pointed adoption of mantic terminology, 
here too poetic inspiration may be high on his agenda. Homer famously invokes 
Muses who witnessed, and are thus knowledgeable, to guide the unknowledge-
able poet’s narrative (Il. II.485f).⁵⁷ Again, Hesiod’s Muses facilitate his authorita-
tive disquisition on seafaring precisely despite his inexperience (Op. 660–662). 
In B18, recall, Xenophanes moves directly from rejecting such traditional models 
of disclosure (B18.1) to explaining the actual epistemological predicament of 
53 We need not, of course, for that reason follow Fränkel’s reduction of ἴδεν, εἰδώς and οὐκ 
οἶδε to expressions of knowledge derived specifically from perceptual experience (1974), pp. 123f; 
cf. Snell (1953), p. 146; McCoy (1989), p. 235; Drozdek (2004), p. 152, convincingly criticised by 
Heitsch (1966), pp. 208–216; cf. Barnes (1982), p. 138; Lesher (1992), p. 162. Since τὸ σαφές expres-
ses not an instance of truth but the generic concept of ‘the truth’, it is difficult to minimise the 
non-sensory connotations of ἴδεν, see Lesher (1983), p. 37; Yonezawa (1989), p. 433; cf. Classen 
(1989), p. 100. We need not determine here whether the elliptical οἶδε refers back to τὸ σαφές 
(alongside ἴδεν and εἰδώς) or, less likely, introduces a second-order clause since, as Hussey 
(1990), p. 18, n.21 observes, knowing the truth about x and knowing that one spoke or believes 
truly about x imply each other.
54 Cf. above, n. 23. Interestingly, when Anytus claims to know what sort of people sophists 
are despite having no experience of them (ἄπειρος αὐτῶν), Socrates jokingly identifies mantic 
means as the only possible explanation, Men. 92c4–7.
55 See e.g. Eur. fr.795 Nauck: θάκοις μαντικοῖς ἐνήμενοι / σαφῶς διόμνυσθ’ εἰδέναι τὰ δαιμόνων 
… θεῶν ἐπίστασθαι πέρι.
56 Lesher (1983), p. 33. For τὰ μάλιστα as a hypothetical best-case-scenario, see Lesher (1992), 
p. 158. τύχοι could suggest an element of chance (contra Yonezawa 1989, p. 433) but need not 
exclude volition pursued methodically (Fränkel 1974, p. 126). At h.Hom. 4.566, the verb expresses 
the condition of a successful mantic consultation (αἴ κε τύχῃσι).
57 Indeed, Snell reads B34 as an allusion to these lines, (1953), p. 139.
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mortals (B18.2). The two couplets constituting B34 display, I believe, the same 
structure. Xenophanes highlights matters external to mortal experience as those 
concerning which mortals lack sure knowledge, and employs pointed mantic ter-
minology to express the objects of knowledge (τὸ σαφές) and true statements and 
beliefs (τετελεσμένον). These observations, along with the parallel structure of 
B18, suggest that, here too, Xenophanes progresses from denying a traditional, 
optimistic concept of disclosure to describing the actual predicament of mortals. 
Xenophanes derives the essential epistemic limitations of mortals, their inabil-
ity to attain knowledge concerning non-experienced matters, from his rejection 
of the notions of disclosure and mantic communication traditionally thought to 
facilitate such knowledge and to enable mortals to transcend these limitations.
The future tense in οὐδέ τις ἔσται indicates a modal thesis regarding what 
is possible and impossible for the ἀνήρ. Lesher (1983) himself recognises that 
his interpretation leaves Xenophanes with an apparently invalid inference: why 
should the argument that mortals cannot attain knowledge through divine dis-
closure merit the conclusion that they cannot attain it simpliciter? He offers two 
explanations: first, diviners enjoyed the status of paradigm cases. Since the con-
ditions of knowledge cannot be met in the most promising cases, they cannot 
be met. Second, though he denies divine disclosure categorically, Xenophanes 
retains the traditional premiss that only through divine disclosure could mortals 
attain knowledge.⁵⁸ Xenophanes is, I think, unlikely to have continued to consider 
diviners the most promising candidates for knowledge after systematically expos-
ing their divination as an empty illusion. Lesher’s second explanation initially 
looks more promising. Here too, however, it is difficult to accept that Xenophanes 
uncritically and unreflectively took on the assumptions operative in divination 
concerning the conditions for the possibility of knowledge while disagreeing only 
about the possibility of fulfilling these conditions. Was Xenophanes unable to 
approach the question of knowledge except through a conceptual-theological 
framework of divine disclosure, which, according to Lesher, he himself repudi-
ated categorically as fundamentally ill-conceived? These unpalatable ramifica-
tions stem from the oversimplifying assumption that Xenophanes discards dis-
closure altogether. Xenophanes, I suggest, identifies what mortals can or cannot 
know through divine disclosure with what they can or cannot know simpliciter 
because he shares with those he criticises the fundamental premiss that the 
nature of divine disclosure determines the manner in which, and certainty with 
which, mortals form propositions concerning non-experienced matters. Although 
he indeed arrives at his view of mortal limitations by rejecting traditional notions 
58 Lesher (1983), pp. 32–34.
rhiz_0012_Tor.indd   16 13.11.2013   14:43:15
264   Shaul Tor
of disclosure, it is no accident that Xenophanes employs divinatory terminology 
(τὸ σαφές, τετελεσμένον) positively. The thrust of B34 is that, contrary to tradi-
tional theological beliefs, divine disclosure is not such as to make knowledge 
about non-experienced matters possible.
Disabused of the illusion that divine disclosure consists in the indirect inti-
mation of everything from the beginning (B18.1), and is such as to bring sure and 
clear knowledge within mortal grasp (B34.1f), we can now turn to the role of dis-
closure in the facilitation of mortal inquiry (B18.2) and the formation of conjec-
tural beliefs (B34.3f).
In itself, B36 only speaks of a set of things which the gods enabled mortals 
to experience. In all likelihood, however, Xenophanes is interested in these 
objects of experience as objects which the gods disclosed as evidence and which 
mortals employed as such when forming beliefs and conjectures.⁵⁹ B18.1 rejects 
a misguided conception of disclosure and B18.2 advocates in its stead temporally 
protracted inquiries: “but searching in time they discover better”. Since, then, 
Xenophanes advances in B36 his own conception of disclosure as a reversal of and 
an alternative to the one rejected in B18.1, his conception of disclosure most prob-
ably relates to the inquiries advocated in B18.2 and, therefore, to the way in which 
mortals form judgements and beliefs through such inquiries.⁶⁰ Xenophanes, 
furthermore, advances some notion of mortal-oriented divine action (θνητοῖσι 
πεφήνασιν, B36) to replace the one he rejects (θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν, B18.1). The echo 
between the two phrases suggests that, in Xenophanean disclosure, the gods 
still in some sense act purposively towards mortals. Xenophanes’ use of the final 
infinitive εἰσοράασθαι corroborates this impression and goes some way towards 
sharpening the purpose in question. Standardly, such final infinitives not only 
imply volition in the performance of the action signified by the finite verb, but 
also clarify the purpose for which that action was performed: regularly, x does 
something to or for y so that y performs another action signified by the infinitive. 
Consider Od. V.196f:
… the Nymph laid out before him all kinds of nourishment
to eat and drink (ἔσθειν καὶ πίνειν).⁶¹
59 Scholars often see in B36 a connection between perception and judgement-formation, see e.g. 
Eisenstadt (1974), p. 149; Lesher (1992), pp. 178f.
60 Note, moreover, that φαίνω is a standard term for divine disclosure influencing mortal belief-
formation, see the passages listed above, n. 38.
61 Cf. e.g. Il. V.775–777; Hes. Th. 218f; Thgn. 446; see further Smyth (1972), pp. 446f. 
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As the Nymph lays out food before her guest in order that he will eat and drink it, 
so too in B36 the gods show things or (if πεφήνασιν is intransitive) things appear 
(through divine agency) for mortals to look upon, i.e. in order that they will look 
upon them. 
The final infinitive εἰσοράασθαι thus supports further also the impression 
that Xenophanean disclosure concerns belief-formation. Elsewhere in the extant 
fragments, we find Xenophanes employing verbs of perception to express the 
import of the perception in question for the formation, retention or revision of a 
belief or judgement: ἰδέσθαι (B32), concerning the nature of the rainbow; ὁρᾶται 
(B28), concerning the upper limits of the earth and, less literally, προσορᾶν (B2.6), 
concerning the perceived social status of a victorious athlete. Retaining also the 
perceptual connotations of εἰσοράασθαι, we may perhaps gloss B36 as “however 
many perceptible things the gods disclosed for mortals to consider”.
As a thinker who is preoccupied with our inability to consider directly all 
the evidence which bears on matters which exceed our experience, Xenophanes 
is naturally concerned with the ways in which our experiential repertoire, so to 
speak, influences our formation of beliefs. B38 instructively reflects this concern 
and offers independent evidence for divine influence on mortal perceptual expe-
rience and belief-formation:
If god had not made yellow honey, they would have said that
figs were much sweeter.
Xenophanes’ counter-factual thought-experiment shows that, if honey had not 
been part of the evidence available for us to consider, we would have judged 
differently concerning figs. In the first instance, B38 seems to caution that even 
some statements that concern what is experienced (say, “honey is the sweet-
est food” or “honey is very sweet”), and that appear to be grounded in a direct 
inspection of the entire relevant body of evidence and not to involve implications 
concerning what we cannot experience, do in fact involve such implications, 
and are therefore corrigible given the possibility of currently unknown counter-
evidence.⁶² Unless mortals can exclude the existence of unknown members of a 
class whose discovery would require a revision of current judgements concerning 
62 Some, not all: we can say with certainty that all the figs we tasted thus far were less sweet 
than all the honey we tasted. B38 does undermine, however, Fränkel’s imputation to Xenopha-
nes, on the basis of B36, of the complacent view that sure knowledge is secured for mortals con-
cerning whatever they experience directly (1974), pp. 123–125; followed by Eisenstadt (1974), p. 
149, n.33; Darcus (1978), p. 33; Drozdek (2004), p. 152. Fränkel’s interpretation conflicts also with 
Aëtius’ report that Xenophanes traced the common but mistaken belief in the sun’s circular orbit 
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other members of that class (as, for example, the discovery of a substance sweeter 
than honey would require us to revise our current judgements concerning the rel-
ative sweetness of honey), these judgements can be asserted only conjecturally.⁶³ 
The vast majority of our beliefs thus commit us to more than what is empirically 
guaranteed by our experience.⁶⁴ In this respect, B38 implies further, I think, an a 
fortiori argument: the same corrigibility would of course characterise statements 
about non-experienced matters, such as the statement that all growing things 
consist of earth and water (B29) on the basis of our observation of growing things 
within our experiential repertoire.
The central point for us is the following: to express a scenario in which 
yellow honey was never available to us as evidence, Xenophanes constructs a 
scenario in which god has never made yellow honey available to us as evidence. 
Xenophanes’ point is that if god had not enabled us to taste honey, we would have 
formed different beliefs concerning figs and concerning sweetness: his conten-
tion is not that we might have judged differently had god not made honey in such 
times and places that we could not taste it even if he had made it. The foregoing 
discussions of B18, B36, and B34 indicate that the theological language of this 
fragment should be taken seriously. In B38, Xenophanes is not simply observing 
that judgements are constrained by the available evidence. The fragment reflects 
a broader point concerning the relation between the range of experiences with 
which the divine presents us and the beliefs and conjectures we form on the basis 
of these experiences. Had god not facilitated for any mortal the particular experi-
ences he did, or had he facilitated different experiences in addition, that mortal’s 
judgements might have turned out otherwise.⁶⁵ B38 and B36 thus illuminate one 
another. B38 demonstrates the same preoccupation as B36 with divine facilita-
tion of mortal perceptual experience, but, unlike the truncated B36, explicitly 
connects this facilitation with the formation of judgement. Again, taken in isola-
tion, B38 shows only the influence of divine action on mortal perceptual experi-
ence and so belief-formation. B36 demonstrates that Xenophanes could conceive 
of this sort of divine influence as, in some sense, purposive (θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν 
εἰσοράασθαι).
to misleading perceptual appearances (A41a), cf. Guthrie (1962), pp. 397f; Lesher (1992), pp. 177, 
218, n.59; Mogyoródi (2006), p. 131. 
63 Cf. Mogyoródi (2006), p. 139. 
64 Following McCoy (1989), 237; Mogyoródi (2006), 138.
65 Lesher observes that the fundamental point of B38 is mortal dependence on the divine, 
(1992), pp. 180f. 
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Any attempt to determine more precisely what kind of volition the gods 
display towards us would unfortunately be necessarily speculative. I would like 
to outline two possible alternatives. On the first alternative, which I tentatively 
favour, Xenophanes radically reconceptualises the notion of divine disclosure 
as the notion that the gods have purposively enabled us to perceive and con-
sider everything that we perceive and consider (call this ‘universal disclosure’). 
On the second, only some of the things that we experience and consider have 
been brought to our attention and disclosed for our consideration by the gods 
(‘particular disclosures’). In other words, does ὁππόσα (B36) signify the totality 
(universal disclosure) or only a subset (particular disclosures) of the perceptual 
experiences of mortals?
Let me first clarify what I mean by ‘universal disclosure’. Since, as mortal 
agents, we are essentially limited both spatially and temporally, the range of 
things we can perceive and consider is also necessarily limited. Furthermore, it is 
on the basis of this limited range of things that we form beliefs and conjectures 
about any matter, whether internal or external to our experience. According to 
universal disclosure, the divine determines the scope and content of the expe-
riences included within the necessarily limited experiential repertoire of any 
mortal agent, intending (inter alia, of course) to facilitate the general discursive 
engagement of mortals with their surroundings and so their formation of beliefs 
on the basis of their experiences (πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι).
B25 is pertinent here: 
ἀλλ’ ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει
But without toil he shakes all things by the thought [or ‘will’] of his mind.
However we cash out precisely the interrelation of god’s φρήν and νόος,⁶⁶ 
Xenophanes’ specification that his god possesses these psychic organs (remi-
niscent of the traditional Zeus), and exerts his cosmic influence through them, 
66 Perhaps most plausibly, Darcus reads φρενί as an instrumental-locative dative, signifying the 
psychic organ with and in which god’s mind operates, (1978), p. 26; cf. e.g. Il. II.3; Il. XVI.435 and 
the closest Homeric parallels Il. IX.600 (νόει φρεσί) and XXII.235 (νοέω φρεσί); see further KRS, 
p. 170, n.3; Darcus (1994), pp. 109–111; Darcus (1995), p. 39. Given B24, god would be spatially 
coextensive with the particular psychic organ φρήν. Alternatively, we may render “by the will 
(φρενί) of his mind,” e.g. Cleve (1965), p. 22. For φρήν as signifying divine volition, see e.g. Il. 
X.45f; Il. XV.194 and the close parallel at Aesch. Supp. 100–103; cf. von Fritz (1974), p. 34; Darcus 
(1994), p. 110. 
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strongly suggests a notion of intelligent, purposeful cosmic governance.⁶⁷ The 
term νοεῖν signifies the cognition of a situation, analogous in its non-inferential 
operation to sense-perception, as with Xenophanes’ god at B24: ὁρᾷ […] νοεῖ […] 
ἀκούει.⁶⁸ Already in our earliest sources, however, νοεῖν designates further a voli-
tional reaction to the situation cognised, wherefore both the verbal and substan-
tive forms came to signify the activity or product of planning and, from similar 
volitional reactions to similar situations, the disposition and character of the 
cognising and planning agent.⁶⁹ The ever-observant νόος of Zeus (Il. XV.461) is 
frequently his will or plan.⁷⁰ In this respect, Zeus’ superior νόος not only com-
prehends but also moulds and fashions the pattern of events, sometimes directly 
affecting or determining mortal actions.⁷¹ 
Xenophanes posits a perfect correspondence between god’s intelligent voli-
tion and its effortless realisation in states-of-affairs (ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο). Notably, 
Zeus’ Olympus-shaking nod to Thetis in Il. I.528–530, an oft-cited parallel to 
B25, indicates his considered adoption of a course of action, which will now 
progress to its inexorable conclusion.⁷² As we saw above, the fruition of divine 
plans is standardly expressed as their arrival at their telos.⁷³ In the light of B25, 
Xenophanes’ talk of the object of a veridical statement as “that which has been 
fulfilled” (τετελεσμένον) appears to stem from a theological world-view that 
construes states-of-affairs as the fulfilment of divine volition. Our evidence 
belies Lesher’s (1983) assimilation of Xenophanes’ implicit view to the explicit 
Epicurean one, that celestial events take place without the ministration of an 
immortal being.⁷⁴ His statement (1992) that Xenophanes’ cosmology banishes 
the traditional gods “to the explanatory sidelines” is misleading: Xenophanes 
67 Cf. Drozdek (2004), pp. 147f; von Fritz (1974), pp. 33f; Warden (1971), p. 10; Lesher (1992), 
pp. 107–109, 104. I cannot see how the issue is determined either way by Xenophanes’ image of 
‘shaking’, from which some scholars infer that divine influence falls short of intelligent direc-
tion, Snell, (1953), pp. 141f; Cornford (1952), p. 147; Hussey (1990), p. 27, n.44; Classen (1989), p. 
95. Attempts to emend κραδαίνει seem arbitrary and unnecessary, see Palmer’s criticisms, (1998), 
pp. 10f, with n.17; cf. Lesher (1992), p. 107.
68 E.g. Il. III.396ff; Od. XVI.160.
69 E.g. plan: Il. IV.308f; Od. II.122; disposition: Il. XVI.34f; Od. I.3; Od. IX.175f. 
70 E.g. Il. VIII.143; Hes. Th. 1002; h.Hom. 4.10. 
71 Il. XV.242; Il. XVI.103; Od. XXIV.164; cf. Pind. Pyth. 5.122f. For these features of νόος and its 
cognates, and for numerous further parallels, see von Fritz (1974), esp. pp. 23f, 33; Warden (1971), 
pp. 3f, 6–9; Darcus (1978), p. 26; (1994), pp. 107f, 119ff; (1995), pp. 37, 44ff.
72 Mogyoródi notes this (2002), p. 283, n.140.
73 Above, p. 261, with n. 47; cf. also Th. 1002; h.Hom. 4.10 (μεγάλοιο Διὸς νόος ἐξετελεῖτο); 
h.Hom. 23.2; h.Hom. 2.323; Thgn. 142 (θεοὶ δὲ κατὰ σφέτερον πάντα τελοῦσι νόον).
74 Lesher (1983), p. 28; cf. Barnes (1982), p. 96.
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eliminates rather than ‘sidelines’ the traditional, anthropomorphic gods, but his 
divinity retains cosmological explanatory prominence.⁷⁵ Nor can I agree with 
Mogyoródi that Xenophanes maintains “a categorical distinction between nature 
and the divine”.⁷⁶ First, god’s dissimilarity cannot be categorical. For one thing, 
if god’s physical dissimilarity (οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος) meant that he lacked 
a physical body, by parity of reasoning he would also be left without a mind 
(οὔτε νόημα, B23.2).⁷⁷ Second, whatever the spatial relation between god and the 
natural world (if Xenophanes ever addressed this question), B38 guarantees that 
god facilitates directly even minute processes occurring in that world, while B25 
indicates that such facilitation is exercised intelligently, purposively and univer-
sally.
If god’s ‘growing’ of honey (to render ἔφυσε, B38) is an instance of the 
causal facilitation of such ‘growing’ in general, then, since the class of things 
that “become and grow” (ὅσα γίνοντ’ ἠδὲ φύονται) consist of earth and water 
(B29), and since we mortals too “come to be from earth and water” (ἐκγενόμεσθα, 
B33), the continual emergence and preservation of particular mortal lives are 
themselves part of god’s intelligent governance. In disclosing things for mortals 
to consider, the divine could display towards them the same sort of cosmic, 
intelligent volition which it displays in directing all natural processes, however 
large-scale or minute. Making possible and realising (i) the scope and content 
of any mortal’s experiential repertoire, (ii) mortals themselves as perceptive and 
cognitive agents and (iii) the discursive engagement of mortals with the world 
around them (εἰσοράασθαι) would thus be part of the divine’s cosmic plan. On 
this reading, ὁππόσα (B36) comprises the totality of mortal experiences. God’s 
making of honey, then, represents a genuine instance of disclosure, while mortal 
belief-formation and conjectural reasoning are indeed informed and constrained 
by the evidence which the divine resolved to disclose (B38). Xenophanes, on the 
universal reading, discards the mantic idea that a subset of our experiences was 
occasioned by the divine to encourage the formation of particular judgements. 
Rather, he counters, everything we see, everything we experience has appeared to 
us (in part) for us to look upon and consider.
75 Lesher (1992), p. 137; cf. Classen (1989), p. 96. It has been argued that the view that the world 
is governed by intelligent, divine power was a pervasive and long unquestioned assumption in 
the sixth and early fifth centuries, see Sedley (2007), pp. 1–8; Guthrie (1952), esp. pp. 90–93, 96; 
cf. Palmer (1998), pp. 11, 33f; Warden (1971), p. 12; Drozdek (2004), p. 147; Long (1996), p. 140.
76 Mogyoródi (2002), p. 264, cf. (2006), pp. 144f, 150.
77 Cleve (1965), p. 10; Broadie (1999), p. 211; cf. KRS (1983), p. 172; Lesher (1992), p. 94. Mogyoródi 
in fact attributes both categorical dissimilarity and a body to Xenophanes’ god, ascribing the 
contradiction to Xenophanes himself, (2002), p. 275.
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Importantly, it does not follow from this reading of B36 that the divine is 
especially concerned with mortals. B36 reflects rather that Xenophanes is espe-
cially concerned with this particular aspect of intelligent and purposeful divine 
actions, namely, the sense in which some of them purposively facilitate, among 
innumerable other things of course, mortal experience and belief-formation 
(θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι). By maintaining that the divine enables us to 
experience, and to engage with our experiences discursively, Xenophanes would 
of course not be suggesting that it runs the cosmos simply or especially so that 
mortals will have something to think about.⁷⁸
The phrase “belief (δόκος) is fashioned (τέτυκται) for all”⁷⁹ in B34.4 is also 
pertinent here. Lesher observes that, in Homer, τέτυκται commonly signifies 
things fashioned for mortals by gods.⁸⁰ Indeed, τέτυκται can indicate the lot of 
mortals (and also immortals) as determined by their place within a world-order 
regulated by divine agency only through which things are (made to be) what they 
are.⁸¹ The oft-cited Orphic slogan Διὸς δ’ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται celebrates Zeus as 
the ruler and preserver of both cosmic events and specifically mortal existence.⁸² 
According to universal disclosure, the divine indeed fashions opinion or opining 
(δόκος) for all.
According to the particular disclosures alternative, on the other hand, the 
divine brings particular things to the consideration of some mortals (εἰσοράασθαι) 
in some circumstances. This does not mean, of course, that the gods communi-
cate messages. Rather, they guide these mortals in their formation of inquisitive 
(ζητοῦντες, B18.2) beliefs, and perhaps also everyday ones.⁸³ Xenophanes could 
have been concerned to insist that, given the essential spatio-temporal limitations 
of mortals, even if some conjectures are based on such disclosures, they cannot 
support knowledge claims (B34). We should not exclude offhand the possibil-
ity that Xenophanean deities could show such concern for individual mortals. 
Xenophanes prescribes prayers for the capacity to act justly (B1.13–16), possibly 
78 I am grateful to Patricia Curd for pressing me to clarify this point.
79 Or, less likely, “over all things”. The parallel between τὸ … σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνήρ and δόκος … ἐπὶ 
πᾶσι suggests to me that πᾶσι is masculine.
80 Lesher (1992), p. 159.
81 See e.g. Il. XVIII.115–121; Il. III.101; h.Hom. 5.29–32; h.Hom. 2.269; Il. IV.84 = Il. XIX.224; Il. 
XIV.246; Il. XXI.191; Hes. Op. 744f, 752; cf. h.Hom. 2.86 (ἐτύχθη).
82 PDerv. col.17.12 (cf. col.19.10); Pl. Lg. 715e8–716a1 with the scholiast; ps.-Ar. De mundo 401a25ff 
(ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων); Porph. apud Eus. PE. III.9.2 (μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων); for these passages, cf. 
Palmer (1998), pp. 26–31 (not discussing B34.4). Classen mentions the parallel, (1989), p. 100.
83 God’s making of honey in B38 would reflect a preoccupation with divine influence on mortal 
beliefs without necessarily constituting an instance of the disclosure spoken of in B36.
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signalling that the divine may aid those, whose prayers it heeds, to do so. His 
criticism of imputations of immorality to the gods (B11f) could imply that such 
predications constitute category errors, but could, conversely, suggest an insis-
tence on the moral goodness of the gods to whom we are to pray for the capac-
ity to act justly.⁸⁴ Again, Xenophanes reportedly observed that an oath is not an 
equal challenge for pious and impious men, in all likelihood because the latter do 
not fear divine retribution.⁸⁵ Still, one may reasonably insist that, Xenophanes’ 
talk of prayers notwithstanding, the cognitive dissimilarity of the divine (B23) 
should involve a lack of particular awareness of, or concern for, particular mortal 
affairs, and that a non-anthropomorphic Xenophanean deity is consequently a 
less personal being than particular disclosures require. When affirming god’s 
immobility, Xenophanes employs a verb of motion which suggests direct divine 
interference in particular mortal affairs.⁸⁶ Indeed, if Xenophanes held that the 
gods disclose particular things to particular mortals in particular circumstances, 
it becomes more difficult to see what he found so objectionable about mantic 
communication in the first place.
Arguably, then, universal disclosure is the more probable interpretation of 
the notion of divine, mortal-oriented purpose operative in Xenophanes’ notion 
of divine disclosure. 
Universal disclosure would, and particular disclosures could, influence the 
formation of mortal beliefs, not just concerning the natural world, but when-
ever a discursive engagement with observed experience plays a formative role. 
Xenophanes’ critically digested experience of the fall of Colophon, for example, 
supports his contention that luxury is socially deleterious (B3). But this raises an 
interesting albeit irremediably speculative question, which I cannot adequately 
address here: does Xenophanean disclosure influence the formation of theologi-
cal beliefs? The role of observed experience in Xenophanes’ theological method-
ology is hotly debated, and many scholars ascribe to him aprioristic theological 
reasoning. Barnes and Mogyoródi, indeed, deny that conjectures based on sense-
experience play any part whatsoever.⁸⁷ One could argue that B15 and B16 suggest 
84 Category mistake: Mogyoródi (2002), esp. pp. 273f; Reiche (1971), pp. 97f; moral goodness: 
Heidel, p. 258; Barnes (1982), pp. 93f.
85 Ar. Rhet. 1377a19 = A14. I rely here on Lesher’s analysis of this report (1992), p. 201, n.15.
86 οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαι (B26), see e.g. Il. V.456, 461.
87 Barnes (1982), pp. 82–99; Mogyoródi (2002), e.g. p. 265 (“rational moral reflection”); cf. 
(2006), pp. 145f; for rational theologising, cf. also McKirahan (1994), p. 61f; Warren (2007), pp. 
46, 54. Reiche argues bizarrely that Xenophanes’ theology is empirical since god is the longest 
period of time, (1971), pp. 96–100. Others suggest divine inspiration (Cleve 1965, pp. 28–30) or 
mystic intuition (Jaeger 1947, p. 49; Nietzsche 1974, pp. 120f).
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a suspicious attitude toward naive, uncritical derivations of theology from our 
parochial experience of ourselves as other sentient beings. In B26, furthermore, 
Xenophanes appears to draw inferences from some notion of theological pro-
priety (οὐδέ … ἐπιπρέπει).⁸⁸ We may, however, wish to soften the assertion that 
theology proceeds without any recourse to observed experience. First, positive 
cosmological propositions can constitute negative theological propositions: Iris 
(etc) is in fact a cloud (B32, n.b. ἰδέσθαι (cf. εἰσοράασθαι, B36); cf. A43, A38).⁸⁹ 
Again, in B16 ethnographic observations about the divergent representations of 
the divine in different cultures inform Xenophanes’ polemic against anthropo-
morphism. Second, I see no Xenophanean reason to exclude the possibility that 
observed experience may positively influence our conjectures about unseen gods. 
For example, cosmic regularities such as the daily generation and quenching of 
suns (A33, A41) may well have been taken to corroborate the belief that a divine 
intelligence directs such processes (B25).⁹⁰ Finally, since many of Xenophanes’ 
theological propositions take the via negativa, the conceptual framework of his 
theology is intelligible only in reference to those attributes whose ascription to 
the gods he rejects. The gods, for example, do not wear clothing (B14) or commit 
adultery (B11f). In this weak but important sense, observed experience is the 
basic condition of discursive inquiry as such.⁹¹
*
88 Lesher (1992, p. 112) convincingly rejects Reiche’s attempt (1971, pp. 93–95) to divest the ex-
pression of normative connotations.
89 Broadie argues similarly, (1999), p. 209. 
90 Aristotle famously writes that Xenophanes formed the view that ‘the One is (the) god’ (or 
that ‘(the) god is (the) One’) εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας (Metaph. A.5 986b21–27 = A30). 
Although the view itself could hardly be Xenophanes’, Aristotle may be reflecting the fact that 
empirical observation played a role in his theology. Palmer (1998, pp. 5–7) persuasively argues 
that ‘οὐρανόν’ here signifies, not what Xenophanes referred to when he stated that “the One is 
(the) god”, but what he considered before arriving at that view.
91 Gábor Betegh suggests to me yet another possible interpretation of the logic of B18.1, which 
is also identical with neither the majority nor the minority readings, and which would also take 
Xenophanes to reject traditional notions of divine disclosure and to supplant them with his own, 
alternative notion of disclosure as I have reconstructed it here. Perhaps with the prefix ὑπό in the 
exceptional and pointed term ὑπέδειξαν Xenophanes reflects his own notion of divine disclosure 
as opposed to traditional notions and not, as I argued above, vice versa. Perhaps ὑπέδειξαν re-
flects the indirectness which arguably characterises divine disclosure on Xenophanes’ own view: 
after all, for Xenophanes, as I have reconstructed his position, the divine does not communicate 
truths to mortals, but rather purposively renders them able to form true beliefs about matters 
external to their experience by facilitating their discursive engagement with their surroundings. 
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Many scholars infer that Xenophanes denied disclosure altogether simply from 
his advocacy of inquiry (B18.2). According to Mogyoródi, for example, the expres-
sion ζητοῦντες (as they search or by searching) “explicitly contrasts […] with 
divine revelation”.⁹² Shorey rightly observes that glosses of ζητοῦντες as “search-
ing by themselves” supply an αὐτοί Xenophanes never used.⁹³ More importantly, 
the advocacy of temporally protracted inquiries is perfectly consistent with 
Xenophanes’ notion of divine disclosure, whether one opts for the universal or the 
particular interpretation of it. But, if the arguments advanced above are accepted, 
we must also re-evaluate the nature and complexity of Xenophanes’ engagement 
with traditional paradigms of disclosure, and divination in particular. To that end, 
we may usefully probe also the widespread assumption that traditional models of 
divine disclosure necessarily conflict with mortal agency. A consideration of the 
role of interpretive, conjectural reasoning in Greek divination will undermine the 
misconception that mantic disclosure typically consisted in the direct transmis-
sion of truths to passive mortal recipients.
Disclosure typically consists in the following: the gods, knowing a proposi-
tion p, which concerns a state-of-affairs that is somehow external to mortal expe-
rience, cause the mortal agent to perceive an object or event with the intention 
that the agent will interpret that object or event to mean, and therefore come to 
believe, p.⁹⁴ The gods, in other words, communicate p.⁹⁵ It is, however, up to the 
diviner to decode the omen correctly. Although we cannot determine to what 
extent interpretations of divine messages were deduced from systematic exegetic 
rules, it appears that they typically started from certain basic semiotic principles 
In B18.1, Xenophanes could be stipulating that not even in this indirect manner did the gods dis-
close to mortals everything from the beginning. Note that this interpretation would not be identi-
cal with the minority reading because it takes Xenophanes not simply to restrict the temporal and 
quantitative scope of divine disclosure but also to qualify the manner of disclosure (ὑπέδειξαν). 
Now, many of the foregoing observations concerning the language and rhetoric of B18.1, and con-
cerning its apparent relation to other extant fragments and to certain prominent contemporary 
theological and epistemological attitudes, favour the particular analysis of the line’s logic which 
I advanced above and according to which the term ὑπέδειξαν signals traditional models of divine 
disclosure, and this remains on balance my preferred reading. But I can see nothing to exclude 
conclusively this ingenious alternative suggestion, which would amount to the same overall view 
of Xenophanes’ epistemology and theology as the one I have defended here.
92 Mogyoródi (2006), pp. 126f, 150f; cf. Gomperz (1906), p. 162; Kleingü nther (1933), p. 41; Dodds 
(1973), p. 4; McKirahan (1994), p. 68; Wardle (2006), p. 107.
93 Shorey (1911), p. 89; cf. Tulin (1993), p. 131.
94 For some ways in which p could concern matters external to mortal experience, see above, 
n. 23.
95 Cf. Denyer, above, n. 43.
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(e.g. lightning on the right is a favourable sign (Il. II.353), a lobeless liver unfa-
vourable) and were further elaborated in light of the nature of the inquiry or cir-
cumstances.⁹⁶ Since any mortal interpretation is fallible, divinations were gener-
ally regarded as conjectural. Among countless examples that could be cited, the 
Iliad offers a particularly clear one. Calchas infers from the portent of a serpent 
devouring eight young sparrows and then their mother that the Greeks shall war 
for as many years and in the tenth take Troy (Il. II.303–330).⁹⁷ Odysseus stresses 
to the Greeks that they all witnessed the omen in question (301f) and urges them 
to stay in Troy to discover whether or not Calchas divined (i.e. interpreted it) cor-
rectly (ἢ ἐτεὸν Κάλχας μαντεύεται ἦε καὶ οὐκί, 299f). Here Calchas’ own consul-
tants and supporters represent his divination as a conjecture, to be verified only 
if and when the state of affairs in question comes within the scope of their own 
experience. In Cicero’s On Divination, Quintus reflects much the same view when 
he replies to the objection that mantic predictions do not invariably come true 
that the same can be said of any conjectural discipline (De div. I.14.24). Although 
Quintus speaks specifically of omen-divination, the integral and fallible role 
of mortal exegetic reasoning in the derivation of beliefs from divine disclosure 
applies no less to oracle divination, a principle analysed by Plato (Tim. 72a1ff) 
and dramatised by Euripides (Ion 532ff). Indeed, the same principle underlies 
(although it could hardly exhaust) Heraclitus’ statement that the lord at Delphi 
neither says nor conceals but gives a sign (B93).⁹⁸
Indeed, one did not have to be a professional diviner in order to work out 
what an omen or oracle means. The gods did not necessarily restrict their commu-
nications to a handful of chosen individuals, and divination was practicable by 
any mortal sufficiently informed of the basic semiotic principles who recognised 
a divine sign as such. Polydamas infers from an eagle flying on the left, carrying a 
snake which it fails to deliver to its nest, that the Trojans shall likewise make some 
military advances but fail to finish the task. Though not a diviner,⁹⁹ he avers that 
96 Flower: “context informs interpretation”, (2008), p. 117; cf. Trampedach (2008), p. 223.
97 For later examples of such mantic exegetic reasoning see e.g. Plutarch, citing the fourth-
century Theopompus of Chios, Dion. 24; cf. Timol. 8.
98 For Heraclitus, see further Kahn (1979), pp. 123f. Fontenrose portrays the historical Delphic 
oracle as essentially a Yes / No answering service (1978, see pp. 233–235, countered effectively by 
Parker 2000, p. 80, with nn.14f), but its cultural representations are anyway at least as pertinent 
for our investigation. For mortal agency in oracle-interpretation, see further Struck (2005); cf. 
Johnston (2005), pp. 16f; even lot and dice divination: De div. I.18.34; cf. Graf (2005), p. 62.
99 Il. XIII.730–733 notwithstanding, see Flower (2008, p. 120, n.30) against Dillery (2005, pp. 
172f).
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he interpreted as a diviner would have (Il. XII.211–229).¹⁰⁰ Like any discipline such 
as poetry, medicine or masonry (listed alongside divination as ‘public-crafts’ at 
Od. XVII.383f), divination could be performed badly or by amateurs.
To be sure, we have seen above (p. 260, with n.45) that diviners also make 
knowledge claims, however inconsistent that may seem with the general con-
ception of divinations as conjectural.¹⁰¹ Indeed, Calchas as augur is accorded 
knowledge by both the poet and his characters (Il. I.69f, 384f). That diviners also 
advanced such knowledge claims is perhaps partly due to professional confi-
dence (or confidence in the profession) and self-promotion. Certainly, it might 
also derive from some notion of divine favour or inspiration. I do not claim that 
divination always or even usually involved the picturesque allegorical interpreta-
tions instantiated by Calchas and Polydamas – indeed, Homeric divination is not 
invariably inferential¹⁰² – nor do I wish to exclude the elusive notion of inspiring 
divine guidance from Greek omen-interpretation.¹⁰³ The lay Helen, for example, 
reasons concerning an omen as the gods inspire her to reason (Od. XV.172ff). The 
important point for us is the following: from Homer onwards, divination is regu-
larly represented as the active application of fallible human interpretive reason-
ing to encoded divine communications and not typically as a direct and infallible 
transmission of truths to passive mortal recipients.¹⁰⁴
Despite their fundamental differences, then, there are also certain conti-
nuities between the notions of divine disclosure operative in divination and in 
Xenophanes’ epistemology. On both accounts, the nature of their interaction 
with the divine determines the epistemic capacities and limitations of mortals 
(B34). On both accounts, mortals form beliefs about states-of-affairs external to 
their experience by applying their reasoning to what the gods disclosed in order 
(for Xenophanes, among many other things) to endow mortals with the ability 
100 Cf. Od. XV.160–178 and, for amateur oracle-interpretation, Hdt. VII.142f (where Themisto-
cles reasons correctly against the expert chresmologues; cf. Harrison 2006, p. 140; Dillery 2005, 
pp. 210–212; Johnston 2005, p. 17); Xen. Hell. III.3.3 (cf. Plut. Lys. 22.5f; Ages. 3.3–5). See also Xen. 
Cyrop. 1.6.2; Anab. V.6.29; VI.1.31; VI.4.15 with Flower (2008), p. 129.
101 Compare the chorus’ divergent statements about Teiresias as mantis at Soph. OT. 497–501 
and OT. 297–299.
102 At Il. VII.44–53, Helenus somehow ‘overhears’ divine deliberations; cf. Theoclymenus’ vi-
sion at Od. XX.351–362. Both events are otherwise unparalleled in Homer; Theoclymenus augurs 
standardly at Od. XV.525–534.
103 See the qualified reactions of Flower (2008, pp. 84–90, 26; cf. 37–50, 130 on mantic families) 
and Dillery (2005, pp. 171f) to Plato’s (Phdr. 244b6–d5) and Cicero’s (De div. I.6.11) influential 
dichotomy between uninspired technical divination (e.g. augury, extispicy) and inspired natural 
divination (dreams, ecstasy).
104 Following Vernant (1991); Flower (2008), pp. 13f.
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to do so. A case in point: Xenophanes made conjectures about the state of the 
earth in the distant past and about its future submersion on the basis of marine 
fossils found inland (A33, A32).¹⁰⁵ Herodotus shows that even here Xenophanes 
advances on what would fall naturally within the epistemic reach of mantic com-
munication. Onomacritus, he writes, would have succeeded in falsely ascribing 
to the ancient Musaeus an oracle stating that the islands lying off Lemnos would 
disappear under the sea had he not been caught red-handed in the act of inter-
polation (VII.6). Within the framework of his theology, Xenophanes’ conjectures 
about the earth are in effect propositions about the content of divine volition 
which will later be realised in states-of-affairs (νόου φρενί, B25; τετελεσμένον, 
B34). If in B36 Xenophanes was gesturing at the more familiar idea that the gods 
may guide certain mortal inquirers, the discovery of marine fossils would be a 
prime candidate for an instance of such disclosure. More probably, however, it is 
in the sense that a purposive divine intelligence enabled and governed his exis-
tence as a perceptive and discursive agent, and determined the scope and content 
of his experiential repertoire, that Xenophanes would maintain that the fossils he 
observed, like the honey he tasted, were disclosed for his consideration by the 
gods.
Rather than messages, then, the gods disclose evidence. Xenophanes 
advances his conception of divine disclosure against the mantic one, and I by 
no means wish to downplay the fundamental differences between the two. 
Although divination did not in general marginalise mortal agency and reasoning, 
Xenophanes lays revolutionary emphasis on expanding the body of experience on 
the basis of which we form our conjectures. It is precisely as part of his iconoclas-
tic repudiation of divination that Xenophanes prescribes temporally protracted 
inquiries as opposed to slicing open cattle or observing birds. Furthermore, if 
diviners claimed epistemic superiority to all other mortals, on the assumption 
that it is only on the basis of divine signs that mortals can attain knowledge con-
cerning certain states-of-affairs,¹⁰⁶ Xenophanes most probably made divine dis-
closure the permanent and fundamental condition of all mortal belief-formation. 
At the same time, Xenophanes himself manifests an urgent sense of superiority 
over the authorities, beliefs and values of his contemporaries.¹⁰⁷ Xenophanes’ 
105 For a rigorous and sympathetic account of Xenophanes as a serious and critical natural 
philosopher, see Mourelatos (2008).
106 E.g. Il. I.62f, 384f. Xenophon formulates the principle explicitly: Cyrop. I.6.46; Hipp. 9.9. 
107 As forcefully highlighted by Yonezawa (1989); cf. Gemelli Marciano (2002), pp. 90–96. Note 
e.g. B2.11–13. It seems extremely unlikely, however, that B34 identifies the limitations of every 
mortal, past or future, except Xenophanes, pace Snell (1953), pp. 140–143, 145; Cleve (1965), 
pp. 27–30; Yonezawa (1989), p. 433; Wiesner (1997), p. 22; Drozdek (2004), p. 152; Gemelli Mar-
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own sense of superiority most probably derives, I think, from his revolutionary 
recognition of the epistemological limitations all mortals share (i.e. of the true 
nature of divine disclosure), as well as from a lifetime of inquiry informed by 
this recognition. The critical expansion of our experiential repertoire may con-
clusively falsify a previously held belief (e.g. “figs are the sweetest substance”) 
or inconclusively justify the formation or retention of conjectures by assessing 
them against an ever growing body of experiences (cf. B18.2, B38).¹⁰⁸ Disabused 
of what he took to be theological fantasies, and informed of the pitfalls haunt-
ing mortal belief-formation, Xenophanes developed his cosmological, theologi-
cal and socio-moral world-view through many decades of intellectual inquiry 
to which he himself bears witness (B8). Conversely, mortals who reason from 
divinely encoded messages which are not there, who acquiesce in delusions of 
poetic inspiration, or who form beliefs on the basis of their parochial experiential 
repertoire blithely and uncritically, are much more liable to go astray.
We may, then, maintain with Cicero (A52) that Xenophanes indeed repudi-
ated the practice and fundamental premisses of divination. Nor does Xenophanes 
endorse any modified form of the art of deciphering divine messages. But, by 
contrast with the widespread view that he simply eliminated divination and 
other traditional paradigms of disclosure without a trace, the Xenophanes 
who has emerged from this discussion bears a more complex relation to what 
he rejected. In the pivotal case of divine disclosure, certain divinatory supposi-
tions, which Xenophanes rejected, informed the formation of Xenophanean 
alternatives, which in turn formed the infrastructure of his own epistemology. 
In certain important respects, then, Xenophanes’ relation to “the whole deep-
seated complex of ideas” surrounding divine disclosure was not one of a com-
plete “sweeping-aside” from the very ground (funditus), but of a complex, radical 
and subversive appropriation. A longer discussion would do well to explore also 
the various social factors that propelled an iconoclast like Xenophanes to engage 
with divination in this manner. Xenophanes, after all, was an itinerant sage (B8), 
travelling from city to city (B45), counselling on anything from the proper use of 
perfume (B3) or wine (B5) to the nature of the gods, using his wisdom (B2.12) to 
engender lawfulness and prosperity (B2.19, 22) in the community of the polis as 
a whole (πόλις, B2.19, πόλει, 20, πόλιος, 22). He was thus in direct competition 
ciano (2002), pp. 93f. Xenophanes traces the epistemic limitations of mortals to their essential 
spatio-temporal limitations. He indicates no exceptions to the principle that ‘belief’ is allotted to 
all (ἐπὶ πᾶσι, B34.4), see further Lesher (1992), p. 167; Mogyoródi (2006), p. 150, n.88. B35 appears 
to refer to Xenophanes’ own views as instances of belief (δεδοξάσθω).
108 Cf. Reiche (1971), p. 88; Warren (2007), p. 53; Darcus (1978), p. 39, n.58. 
rhiz_0012_Tor.indd   30 13.11.2013   14:43:16
278   Shaul Tor
for the same social and intellectual territory with those itinerant diviners, who 
would have undoubtedly constituted the most frequent and familiar incarnation 
of mantikê for Xenophanes, and who advised both individuals and whole cities 
on the gods and any matter public or private, remaining forever outsiders for the 
communities they counselled.¹⁰⁹ One might also consider that the various types 
of divination practiced in Greece were rather recent Eastern importations¹¹⁰ and 
that Xenophanes was haunted by the fall of his Ionian city to ‘the Mede’ (B22) 
and associated it with the corrupting cultural influence of the East (B3 with 
Theopompus apud Athenaeus XII 526c). Indeed, we saw that Xenophanes both 
appropriates and radically subverts the notion of mantic disclosure: this is a 
recurrent pattern in Greek interactions with Eastern paradigms, practices, crafts, 
and ideas.¹¹¹
‘Philosophy’ and ‘religion’ are and must remain extremely loaded and often 
problematic categories. Xenophanes’ interaction with traditional paradigms of 
disclosure, as I have described it, does not preclude the use of some such dis-
tinction. Indeed, Xenophanes offers a powerful illustration of a thinker whom 
later Greek philosophy identified as a philosophical ancestor and whose thought 
was formed by exposing, criticising, and rejecting deep-seated beliefs and prem-
isses central to what we can identify as traditional religion. We would do well, 
however, to heed Lloyd’s important insight that, when describing the polemical 
emergence of the ‘philosophical’ from the ‘traditional’, we must never invoke 
“any talk of a different mentality, a different logic, or a totally different concep-
tual framework.”¹¹² Xenophanes’ epistemology is, ultimately, no less ‘religious’ 
than ‘philosophical’ and the two are perfectly compatible.
109 See Dillery (2005), esp. pp. 176–178, 184, 223–225; Burkert (1992), pp. 41ff; Flower (2008), 
pp. 29–37, 58f; Vernant (1991), p. 305. For the mantis as outsider, cf. Od. XVII.382–385; Od. I.415f; 
Od. IX.508–510. For the private and civic influence of itinerant diviners, cf. Pl. Lg. 909b5; Rep. 
364e5.
110 Burkert (1992), pp. 41–87 (dating the ‘orientalising period’ to 750–650); Flower (2008), pp. 24f 
(between the eighth and sixth centuries); cf. West (1997), pp. 46–51.
111 Burkert (1992), passim; Osborne (1997), pp. 11–16. In her interesting analysis of Xenophanes’ 
opponents and addressees, Gemelli Marciano surprisingly dismisses offhand the possibility of 
an engagement with diviners, (2002), p. 92, n.19.
112 Lloyd (1979), pp. 265 and passim.
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